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Abstract
This paper examines whether the Chamley-Judd result of a zero optimal capital
tax rate is valid in an innovation-driven growth model. We examine how the optimal
capital tax rate varies with externalities associated with R&D and innovation. Our
results show that the optimal capital tax rate is higher when (i) the stepping on toes
e¤ectis smaller, (ii) the standing on shoulders e¤ect is stronger, or (iii) the extent
of creative destruction is greater. By calibrating our model to the US economy, we nd
that the optimal capital tax rate is positive, at a rate of around 11.9 percent. We also
nd that a positive optimal capital tax rate is more likely to be the case when there is
underinvestment in R&D.
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1 Introduction
Capital income is taxed worldwide. The estimated e¤ective average tax rates on capital
income are around 40% in the United States and 30% in EU countries. In some countries,
such as the United Kingdom and Japan, the capital income tax rates are even up to nearly
60%. From the perspective of welfare maximization, whether these capital tax rates are too
high or too low is an important policy question.
Despite the fact that capital taxes are commonly levied in the real world, a striking theory
put forth by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) suggests that the government should only tax
labor income and leave capital income untaxed in the long run. A number of subsequent
studies, including Chari et al. (1994), Jones et al. (1997), Atkeson et al. (1999), and Chari
and Kehoe (1999), relax key assumptions in Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), and nd their
result to be quite robust. The idea of a zero optimal capital tax has then been dubbed the
Chamley-Judd result, which turns out to be one of the most well-established and important
results in the optimal taxation literature.
In this paper, we revisit the Chamley-Judd result in an innovation-driven growth model.
There are several reasons as to why we choose this environment to study optimal taxation.
First, as stressed by Aghion et al. (2013), it appears that the consideration of growth does
not play much of a role in the debate on the Chamley-Judd result. However, given that the
recent empirical evidence suggests that the tax structure has a signicant impact on economic
growth (e.g., Arnold et al., 2011), it is more plausible to bring the role of growth into the
picture. Second, along the line of the optimal taxation literature, production technology
is treated as exogenously given. The role of endogenous technological change driven by
R&D has thus been neglected in previous models. In view of the fact that innovation is
a crucial factor in economic development as well as in the improvement of human well-
being, overlooking this element could lead to a suboptimal design of tax policies. Our study
thus aims to ll this gap. Third, as pointed out by Domeij (2005), a key premise in early
contributions supporting the Chamley-Judd result is that there exist no inherent distortions
and externalities in the economy. If market failures are present, the optimal capital income
tax might be di¤erent from zero. Thus, we introduce an innovation market that featues
various R&D externalities put forth by Jones and Williams (2000). Within this framework
we can study how the optimal capital taxation and R&D externalities interact in ways not
so far understood.
By calibrating the model to the US economy, our numerical analysis shows that the
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optimal capital income tax is signicantly positive at a rate of 12 percent. The reason for a
positive optimal capital income tax in our R&D-based growth model can be briey explained
as follows. In essence, the Chamley-Judd result involves a tax shift between capital income
tax and labor income tax. The basic rationale behind a zero optimal capital tax is that
taxing capital generates more distortion than taxing labor, because taxing capital creates a
dynamic ine¢ ciency for capital accumulation. In our R&D-based growth model, by contrast,
innovation requires R&D labor, as typically specied in standard R&D-based growth models
(e.g., Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995; Acemoglu, 1998). Under such a framework, taxing labor
has a detrimental e¤ect on the incentives for innovation and growth. This introduces a
justication for taxing capital income instead of labor income. On these grounds, it might
be optimal to have a non-zero capital income tax rate.
The main contribution of this study is that it links optimal capital taxation to features of
the innovation process. We vary the parameters capturing important R&D externalities and
see how the optimal capital income tax changes in response. Our main ndings can be briey
summarized as follows. First, under most circumstances, the positive optimal capital income
tax still holds. Second, when knowledge spillovers are large or R&D duplication externalities
are small (thereby increasing the chances of an underinvestment in R&D), it is more likely
that a positive optimal capital income tax rate will result. Third, when creative destruction
is more important in the R&D process, the optimal capital income tax rate should be higher
(lower) if the monopolistic markup is constrained (unconstrained) by the degree of creative
destruction. Fourth, a higher government spending ratio pushes toward a positive optimal
capital income tax.
It is well-known in existing studies (e.g., Aiyagari, 1995; Judd, 1997, 2002; Coto-Martínez
et al., 2007) that when the intermediate rms are imperfectly competitive, capital investment
is too low compared to the socially optimal level. Accordingly, the government should
subsidize capital income to induce a higher level of capital investment, implying that the
optimal capital income tax tends to decrease when the monopolistic markup increases. This
e¤ect is present in our model, but our model also features another e¤ect. As a result,
the optimal capital income tax and the markup display an inverted-U shaped relationship.
In our model, the markup is inversely determined by the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods. A reduction in the substitution elasticity that raises the markup amplies
the productivity of di¤erentiated varieties in the production of nal goods and hence increases
the social value of R&D. In this case, the government is inclined to subsidize labor by taxing
capital given that the R&D sector uses labor. Thus, the optimal capital tax rate eventually
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becomes decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (or increasing
in the markup). In considering this e¤ect, an increase in the monopolistic markup is not
necessarily accompanied by a lower optimal capital income tax.
Our study is related to a vast literature that attempts to overturn the Chamley-Judd
result and obtain a positive optimal capital income tax (e.g., among others, Chamley, 2001;
Erosa and Gervais, 2002; Domeij, 2005; Golosov et al., 2006; Conesa et al., 2009; Aghion et
al., 2013; Chen and Lu, 2013; Piketty and Saez, 2013; Straub andWerning, 2018). This paper
contributes to the literature by introducing the role of endogenous technological change. Two
papers studying the optimal factor tax within the framework of an endogenous growth model
are closely related to the present paper.1 Chen and Lu (2013) consider a human capital-
based endogenous growth model developed by Lucas (1988), and nd that a switch from
labor income taxes to capital income taxes always enhances growth and welfare. Thus, the
government should tax capital income to a maximum level of 99%. Aghion et al. (2013)
also introduce R&D-based growth into the debate of the Chamley-Judd result. However, our
paper di¤ers from Aghion et al. (2013) in the following ways. First, Aghion et al. (2013)
consider a Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model, whereas we adopt an expanding-
variety R&D model (Romer, 1990) while allowing for creative destruction as in Jones and
Williams (2000). Second, Aghion et al. (2013) consider a lab-equipment innovation process
(i.e., R&D uses nal goods as inputs) whereas we assume a knowledge-driven innovation
process (i.e., R&D uses labor as inputs). Under our setting, the welfare cost of taxing labor
is larger than that in their model. Third, in Aghion et al. (2013), a positive optimal capital
income tax arises only when the government spending to output ratio exceeds about 38%,
which is much larger than the empirical value. In our analysis, by contrast, the optimal
capital income tax is positive even if the government spending ratio is quite small (around
14%, which is empirically more realistic). Finally, Aghion et al. (2013) do not examine how
the optimal capital income tax responds to various R&D externalities, which is the main
focus of our analysis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the R&D-based growth
model featuring creative destruction and various types of R&D externalities elucidated by
Jones and Williams (2000). In Section 3 we analyze how capital tax changes a¤ect the
economy in the long run. In Section 4 we quantify the optimal capital income tax rate and
1Another paper by Zeng and Zhang (2002) also introduces factor taxes into an innovation-driven growth
model. Their study, however, focuses on the long-run growth e¤ects of various taxes, instead of focusing on
the normative analysis of the optimal capital taxation.
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examine how its value depends on various R&D externalities. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our framework builds on the scale-invariant R&D-based growth model in Jones andWilliams
(2000). The main novelty of the Jones-Williams model is that it introduces a variety of
R&D externalities into the original variety-expanding R&D-based growth model in Romer
(1990). In this paper, we extend their model by incorporating (i) an elastic labor supply
and (ii) factor income taxes, namely, capital and labor income taxes. To conserve space, the
familiar components of the Romer variety-expanding model will be briey described, while
new features will be described in more detail.
2.1 Households
We consider a continuous-time economy that is inhabited by a representative household. At
time t, the population size of the household is Nt, which grows at an exogenous rate n. Each
member of the household is endowed with one unit of time that can be used to supply labor
to a competitive market or enjoy leisure. The lifetime utility function of the representative
household is given as:2
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln ct +  ln(1  lt)] dt;  > 0;   0; (1)
where ct is per capita consumption and lt is the supply of labor per capita. The parameters
 and  denote, respectively, the subjective rate of time preference and leisure preference.
The representative household maximizes (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
_kt + _et = [(1  K)rK;t   n  ]kt + (re;t   n) et + (1  L;t)wtlt   ct; (2)
where a dot hereafter denotes the derivative with respect to time, kt is physical capital per
capita,  is the physical capital depreciation rate, et is the value of equity shares of R&D
owned by each member, rK;t is the capital rental rate, re;t is the rate of dividend, and wt
is the wage rate. The policy parameters K and L;t are respectively the capital and labor
2Here we assume that household welfare depends on per capita utility. See, e.g., Chu and Cozzi (2014)
for a similar specication.
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income tax rate.3
Solving the dynamic optimization problem yields the following rst-order conditions:
1
ct
= qt; (3)
(1  L;t)wt(1  lt) = ct; (4)
re;t = (1  K)rK;t   : (5)
where qt is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on eq. (2). Equations (3) and (4) are re-
spectively the optimality conditions for consumption and labor supply, and eq. (5) is a
no-arbitrage condition which states that the net returns on physical capital and equity
shares must be equalized. We denote the common net return on both assets as rt (i.e.,
rt = re;t = (1  K)rK;t   ). The typical Keynes-Ramsey rule is:
_ct
ct
= rt   n  : (6)
2.2 The nal-goods sector
A perfectly-competitive nal-good sector produces a single nal output Yt (treated as the
numéraire) by using labor and a continuum of intermediate capital goods, according to the
CES technology:
Yt = L
1 
Y;t
 
AtX
i=1
xt (i)
! 1

; 1 >  > 0; 1= >  > 0; (7)
where LY;t is the labor input employed in nal goods production, xt(i) is the i-th intermediate
capital good, and At is the number of varieties of the intermediate goods.
Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for the labor input
and intermediate goods:
wt = (1  ) Yt
LY;t
; (8)
pt(i) = L
1 
Y;t
 
AtX
i=1
xt (i)
! 1

 1
x 1t (i); (9)
3We drop the subscript t for K because it is treated as an exogenous policy parameter throughout the
paper.
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where pt(i) is the price of the i-th intermediate good.
2.3 The intermediate-goods sector
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistic producer that owns a perpetually
protected patent for that good. The producer uses one unit of physical capital to produce
one unit of intermediate goods; that is, the production function is xt(i) = vt(i), where vt(i)
denotes the capital input employed by monopolistic intermediate rm i. Accordingly, the
prot of intermediate goods rm i is:
x;t(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  rK;tvt(i): (10)
Let t(i) denote the gross markup that the i-th intermediate rm can charge over its
marginal cost; that is:
pt(i) = t(i)rK;t: (11)
Then, the prot of the i-th intermediate rm can be obtained as:
x;t(i) =
t(i)  1
t(i)

Yt
At
: (12)
In subsection 2.5, we will elucidate how t(i) is determined.
2.4 The R&D sector
R&D creates new varieties of intermediate goods for nal-good production. In line with
Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), we assume that new varieties are developed using the labor
input (i.e., R&D scientists and engineers). The production technology is given as:
(1 +  ) _At = ~& tLA;t;   0; (13)
where LA;t is the labor input used in the R&D sector, and ~& t is the productivity of R&D
which the innovators take as given. The parameter  represents the size of the innovation
clusters.4
We follow Jones (1995) to specify that the productivity of R&D takes the following
4In the later analysis, we will provide a more detailed explanation for this parameter.
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functional form:
~& t = &L
 1
A;t A

t ; & > 0; 1   > 0; 1 >  > 0; (14)
where & is a constant productivity parameter. In addition to &, eqs. (13) and (14) contain
three parameters ,  and  . These parameters capture salient features of the R&D process,
as proposed by Jones and Williams (1998).
First, the parameter 1   > 0 reects a (negative) duplication externality or a congestion
e¤ect of R&D. It implies that the social marginal product of research labor can be less than
the private marginal product. This may happen because of, for example, a patent race, or
if two researchers accidentally work out a similar idea. Jones and Williams (1998) refer to
this negative duplication externality as the stepping on toes e¤ect. Notice that this e¤ect is
stronger with a smaller , and it vanishes when  = 1.
Second, the parameter 1 >  > 0 reects a (positive) knowledge spillover e¤ect due to
the fact that richer existing ideas are helpful to the development of new ideas. A higher 
means that the spillover e¤ect is greater. In his pioneering article, Romer (1990) species
 = 1; however, Jones (1995) argues that  = 1 exhibits a scale e¤ect which is inconsistent
with the empirical evidence. We follow Jones (1995) and assume that  < 1 in order to
remove this scale e¤ect. The knowledge spillover e¤ect is dubbed by Jones and Williams
(1998) as the standing on shoulders e¤ect.
Finally, the parameter   0 denotes the size of the innovation clusters, which captures
the concept of creative destruction formalized in the Schumpeterian growth model developed
by Aghion and Howitt (1992). The basic idea is that innovations must come together in
clusters, some of which are new, while others simply build on old fashions. More specically,
suppose that an innovation cluster, which contains (1 + ) varieties, has been invented. Out
of these (1+ ) varieties, only one unit of variety is entirely new and thus increases the mass
of the variety of intermediate goods. The remaining portion, of size  , simply replaces the
old versions. This portion captures the spirit of creative destruction since new versions are
created with the elimination of old versions. However this part does not contribute to an
increase in existing varieties. In other words, for (1 +  ) intermediate goods invented, the
actual augmented variety is 1, while there are  repackaged varieties.
Given ~& t, the R&D sector hires LA;t to create (1 + ) varieties. Thus, the prot function
is A;t = PA;t(1 +  ) _At  wtLA;t. By assuming free entry in the R&D sector, we can obtain:
PA;t =
st
1  st
(1  )Yt
(1 +  ) _At
; (15)
7
where st  LA;t=Lt is the ratio of research labor to total labor supply Lt. Moreover, the
no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety is:
rtPA;t = x;t + _PA;t    
_At
At
PA;t: (16)
In the absence of creative destruction ( = 0), the familiar no-arbitrage condition reports
that, for each variety, the return on the equity shares rtPA;t will be equal to the sum of
the ow of the monopolistic prot x;t plus the capital gain or loss _PA;t. When creative
destruction is present, existing goods are replaced. Accompanied by _At new varieties being
invented, the amount of  _At existing varieties will be replaced. Therefore, for each variety,
the expected probability of being replaced is  _At=At, which gives rise to the expected capital
loss expressed by the last term in eq. (16).
2.5 The monopolistic markup
This subsection explains how the monopolistic markup t(i) is determined. As identied by
Jones and Williams (2000), there are two scenarios in which the markup is decided. The
rst is the unconstrainedcase. In this case, the monopolistic intermediate rm freely sets
the price by maximizing eq. (10) subject to the production function xt(i) = vt(i) and eq.
(9), which yields the pricing rule pt(i) = 1rK;t. We refer to
1

as the unconstrained
markup. The second case is the constrainedcase, which may occur if the new designs are
linked together in the innovation cluster. Specically, a larger size of innovation clusters  
serves as a constraint that controls the magnitude of the monopolistic markup. The intuition
underlying this idea requires a more detailed explanation. Consider that the current number
of varieties is At. Now an innovation cluster with size (1+ ) is developed. This increases the
mass of varieties to At+1; at the same time it also replaces old-version varieties by  units.
Subsequently, the nal-good rm faces two choices. It can either adopt the new innovation
cluster and then use At+1 intermediate goods priced at a markup, or part with the new
innovation cluster and still use At intermediate goods in the production process. If the nal-
good rm chooses the latter, since  varieties have now been displaced, the nal-good rm
only needs to purchase At  units of intermediate goods at a markup price, while the other
 units of displaced intermediate goods can be purchased at a lower (competitive) price.
When the size of an innovation cluster is high (a large value of  ), the nal-good rm will
not tend to adopt the new innovation cluster because sticking to old clusters is cheaper. As
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a result, the intermediate-good rms have to set a lower price so as to attract the nal-good
rm to adopt the new innovation cluster. This adoption constraint explains why an increase
in the size of the innovation clusters reduces the markup.
In an appendix, Jones and Williams (2000) demonstrate that the constrained markup
is negatively related to both the size of the innovation clusters and the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital goods. Specically, they demonstrate that, in order to attract the
nal-good rm to adopt the new innovation cluster, the intermediate-good rms cannot set
a markup that is higher than [(1 + )= ]1= 1. A prot-maximizing rm thus always tends
to set the highest price pt(i) = [(1 +  )= ]1= 1rK;t. We refer to [(1 +  )= ]1= 1 as the
"unconstrained" markup. By combining the constrained markup pricing with the uncon-
strained markup pricing rule mentioned earlier (i.e., pt(i) = 1rK;t), we can conclude that
the equilibrium markup is:
t(i) = min
(
1

;

1 +  
 
 1

 1)
; (17)
which is independent of i and t. Combining eqs. (10) and (17) implies that all intermediate-
good rms are symmetric. Hence, the notation i can be dropped from now on.
2.6 The government and aggregation
The government collects capital income taxes and labor income taxes to nance its public
spending. The balanced budget constraint faced by the government is:
Nt(KrK;tkt + L;twtlt) = Gt; (18)
where Gt is the total government spending. We assume that government spending is a
xed proportion of nal output, i.e., Gt = Yt, where  2 (0; 1) is the ratio of government
spending to output. Now let us dene the aggregate capital stock as Kt = Ntkt, aggregate
consumption Ct = Ntct, and total labor supply Lt = Ntlt. After some derivations, we can
obtain the following resource constraint in the economy: _Kt = Yt   Ct  Gt   Kt.
2.7 The decentralized equilibrium
The decentralized equilibrium in this economy is an innite sequence of allocations {Ct; Kt;
At, Yt; Lt; LY;t; LA;t; xt; vt}1t=0, prices fw t; rK;t; rt; pt; PA;tg1t=0, and policies fK ; L;tg, such
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that at each instant of time:
a. households choose fct; kt; et; ltg to maximize lifetime utility, eq. (1), taking prices and
policies as given;
b. competitive nal-good rms choose fxt; LY;tg to maximize prot taking prices as given;
c. monopolistic intermediate rms i 2 [0; At] choose fvt; ptg to maximize prot taking
rK;t as given;
d. the R&D sector chooses LA;t to maximize prot taking fPA;t; wtg and the productivity
~& t as given;
e. the labor market clears, i.e., Ntlt = LA;t + LY;t;
f. the capital market clears, i.e., Ntkt = Atvt;
g. the stock market for variety clears, i.e., Ntet = PA;tAt
h. the resource constraint is satised, i.e., _Kt = Yt   Ct  Gt   Kt;
i. the government budget constraint is balanced, i.e., Nt(KrK;tkt + L;twtlt) = Gt.
3 Balanced growth path
In this section, we explore the balanced growth path along which each variable grows at a
constant rate, which can be zero. We denote the growth rate of any generic variable Z by
gZ , and drop the time subscript to denote any variable in a steady state. The steady-state
growth rates of varieties and output are given by (see Appendix A):
gA =

1  n; gY =
1
1  

1

  

gA + n: (19a)
Moreover, in order to obtain stationary endogenous variables, it is necessary to dene the
following transformed variables:
k^t  Kt
Nt
; c^t  Ct
Nt
; y^t  Yt
Nt
; a^t  At
N
=(1 )
t
; (19b)
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where   1 + (1= )
(1 )(1 ) > 0 is a composite parameter. For ease of exposition, in line with
Eicher and Turnovsky (2001), k^, c^, y^, and a^ are dubbed the scale-adjusted capital, consump-
tion, output, and R&D varieties, respectively. Based on the transformed variables and the
equilibrium dened in subsection 2.5, the economy in the steady state can be described by
the following set of equations:
r = (1  K)rK    =  + gY ; (20a)
s =
 1


1 (1+ )gA
r   gY +

1 +  1


1 

(1+ )gA
; (20b)
k^
y^
=

rK
; (20c)
(1  ) y^
k^
=
c^
k^
+ gY + ; (20d)
y^ = a^1= k^ ((1  s)l)1  ; (20e)
gA =
1
1 +  
& (sl)
a^1 
; (20f)
l
(1  l) =
(1  L)(1  )
(1  s)
y^
c^
; (20g)
L =
1  s
1  

   K 


; (20h)
in which eight endogenous variables r, s, c^, k^, a^, y^, l, L are determined.
Of particular note, our main focus is on the examination of the capital tax. By holding
the proportion of the government spending constant, an increase in the capital income tax
will be coupled with a reduction in the labor income tax. Therefore, the literature on the
Chamley-Judd result generally assumes that the labor income tax endogenously adjusts to
balance the government budget. This approach has been dubbed as tax shiftingor tax
swapin the literature. Our analysis follows this standard approach in the literature.
3.1 Comparative static analysis
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of capital taxation on the R&D share s of labor, the
endogenous labor income tax rate, labor supply, and other scale-adjusted variables: a^; k^; c^;
11
and y^.5
The long-run R&D labor share, s, is given by
s =
 1


1 (1+ )gA
r   gY +

1 +  1


1 

(1+ )gA
: (21a)
It follows from the above equation that, in the steady state, a change in the capital income tax
rate (21a) does not a¤ect the R&D labor share (i.e., @s=@K = 0). The intuition underlying
@s=@K = 0 can be grasped as follows. The non-arbitrage condition between physical capital
and R&D equity reported in (20a) requires that the return on physical capital be equal to the
return on R&D equity. Given that the return on R&D equity, r = + 1
1 

1

  

gA + n,
is independent of the capital tax rate, the capital income tax rate does not a¤ect the return
on R&D equity and the R&D labor share. Therefore, our analysis does not rely on capital
taxation having a direct e¤ect on the allocation of R&D and production labor. Instead,
our analysis is based on the trade-o¤ between labor supply and capital investment as in the
standard Chamley-Judd setting.
From (20h), we have:
L =
1  s
1  

   K 


; (21b)
Based on (21a), we have:
@L
@K
=  1  s


1   < 0: (21c)
The above equation shows that an increase in the capital income tax rate is coupled with a
reduction in the labor income tax rate.
Given a constant capital income tax rate K , labor supply in the steady state is given
by:
l = 1  
+ 1
[(1 ) (+gY ) (1 K )(++gY ) ]
(1 L)(1 )
(1 s)
. (22a)
5We solve the dynamic system in Appendix B, and a detailed derivation of the comparative static analysis
is presented in Appendix C.
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It is straightforward from eq.(22a) to infer the following result:
@l
@K
=
( 1 s
1 )[1   +  1 (+gY )+(1+ )gA ](1  l)l
( +  + gY )(1  L)[1     ( + gY ) (1 K)(++gY ) ]
> 0. (22b)
Equation (22b) indicates that, when taxes shift from a labor income tax to a capital
income tax, a rise in the capital income tax rate leads to an increase in labor supply. The
intuition underlying this result can be explained as follows. In response to a rise in the
capital income tax rate, the following e¤ect emerges. Raising the capital tax rate reduces
the labor income tax rate (see eq. (21b)) and raises the after-tax wage income, thereby
exerting a positive e¤ect on labor supply. Therefore, a rise in the capital income tax rate is
accompanied by an increase in labor supply.
Moreover, the scale-adjusted R&D varieties a^ is given by:
a^ =

&
(1 +  )gA
1=(1 )
(sl)=(1 ); (23a)
where s and l are reported in eqs. (21a) and (22a). With @s=@K = 0, it is quite easy from
eq. (23a) to derive that:
@a^
@K
=
a^
(1  )l
@l
@K
> 0: (23b)
Equation (23b) indicates that a rise in the capital income tax rate boosts scale-adjusted
R&D varieties. The intuition is clear. Following a rise in the capital income tax rate that is
coupled with a decline in the labor income tax rate, the household is motivated to increase
its labor supply. This in turn increases labor input allocated to the R&D sector (LA = Nsl).
Then, as reported in eq. (23a), given that scale-adjusted R&D varieties a^ is increasing in
the R&D labor input sNl, a^ will increase in response to a rise in K .
From eqs. (20a), (20c), (20d), (23a), and (20e), we can infer that:
y^ =

&
(1 +  )gA
 1= 
(1 )(1 )
(sl)
1= 
1 

1 

(1  K)
( +  + gY )
 
1 
(1  s)l; (24a)
where
@y^
@K
=

  
(1  )(1  K) +

l
@l
@K

y^
>
<
0: (24b)
13
Equation (24b) indicates that a rise in the capital income tax rate has ambiguous e¤ects on
the scale-adjusted output y^. As shown in eq. (24b), two conicting e¤ects emerge following
a rise in the capital income tax rate. First, a rise in the capital income tax rate shrinks
capital investment, which in turn generates a negative impact on output. Second, a rise in
the capital income tax rate is accompanied by a fall in the labor income tax rate, which
motivates the household to provide more labor supply. This increase in labor supply implies
that more labor input is available for the R&D sector and in turn boosts R&D varieties,
thereby contributing to a positive e¤ect on output. If labor supply is exogenous ( = 0), the
second positive e¤ect is absent (@l=@K = 0), and a higher capital income tax rate lowers
output. However, if labor supply is endogenous ( > 0), the two opposing e¤ects are present,
and the output e¤ect of capital income taxation depends upon the relative strength between
these two e¤ects.
From eqs. (20a), (20c), and (20d), we have:
k^ =
(1  K)
( + gY )
y^; (25a)
c^ = [(1  )  (1  K)]y^; (25b)
where   (+gY )
(++gY )
is a composite parameter. Based on eqs. (25a) and (25b), the e¤ects
of K on k^ and c^ can be expressed as:
@k^
@K
=   
( + gY )
y^ +
(1  K)
( + gY )
y^
@K
(26a)
= [
@l
l@K
  1
(1  )(1  K) ]
(1  K)
( + gY )
y^
>
<
0;
@c^
@K
= y^ + [(1  )  (1  K)] @y^
@K
(26b)
= f + [(1  )  (1  K)][ @l
l@K
  
(1  )(1  K) ]gy^
>
<
0:
The intuition behind eqs. (26a) and (26b) can be explained as follows. It is clear in
eq. (25a) that capital income taxation a¤ects scale-adjusted capital k^ through two channels.
The rst channel is the capital-output ratio k^=y^ = (1 K)
(+gY )
, and the second channel is the
level of scale-adjusted output y^. The rst term after the rst equality in eq. (26a) indicates
that the rst channel denitely lowers the level of k^. Moreover, as shown in eq. (24b),
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the second channel may either raise or lower the level of k^ since capital taxation leads to
an ambiguous e¤ect on y^. As a consequence, the net e¤ect of capital taxation on the scale-
adjusted capital stock k^ is still uncertain. Similarly, as indicated in eq. (25b), capital income
taxation also a¤ects c^ through two channels. The rst channel is the consumption-output
ratio c^=y^ = [(1 )  (1 K)], and the second channel is the level of scale-adjusted output
y^. The rst channel denitely boosts the level of c^, while the second channel may either
raise or lower the level of c^ since capital taxation leads to an ambiguous e¤ect on y^. As
a consequence, the net e¤ect of capital taxation on scale-adjusted consumption c^ remains
ambiguous.
4 Quantitative results
In this section, we simulate the transitional dynamic e¤ects of capital taxation and compute
the optimal capital tax rate by performing a quantitative analysis.6 We calibrate the para-
meters of our theoretical model based on US data to quantify the optimal capital tax. Then
we explore how the optimal capital tax responds to important parameters that feature R&D
externalities and the government size.
By dropping the exogenous terms, the life-time utility of the representative household
reported in eq. (1) can be expressed as:
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln c^t +  ln(1  lt)] dt; (27)
in which c^t and lt are functions of K . The optimal capital tax that takes into account the
welfare e¤ects including transitional dynamics is the one that maximizes eq. (27).
4.1 Calibration
To carry out a numerical analysis, we rst choose a baseline parameterization, as reported
in Table 1. Our model has eleven parameter values to be assigned. These parameters are
either set to a commonly used value in the existing literature or calibrated to match some
empirical moments in the US economy. We now describe each of them in detail. In line with
Andolfatto et al. (2008) and Chu and Cozzi (2018), the labor income share 1    and the
discount rate  are set to standard values 0.4 and 0.05, respectively. The population growth
6We describe the dynamic system of the model in Appendix B.
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rate n is set to 0.011 as used by Conesa et al. (2009). The physical capital depreciation rate
is set to 0.0318 so that the initial capital-output ratio is 2.5 as in Lucas (1990). The initial
capital tax rate K is set to 0.3 based on the average US e¤ective tax rate estimated by Carey
and Tchilingurian (2000). A similar value of the capital income tax rate has been adopted in
Domeij (2005) and Chen and Lu (2013). As for the government size (the ratio of government
spending to output), data for the US indicate that this is around 20 percent (Gali, 1994),
and has slightly increased in recent years. We therefore set  to be 0.22, which is the average
level during 2001-2013, to reect its increasing trend. The parameter for leisure preference
 is chosen as 1.5901 to make hours worked around one third of total hours.
Table 1. Benchmark Parameterization
Denition Parameter Value Source/Target
Labor income share 1   0.6 Andolfatto et al. (2008)
Discount rate  0.05 Chu and Cozzi (2018)
Population growth rate n 0.011 Conesa et al. (2009)
Initial capital tax rate K 0.3 Carey and Tchilingurian (2000)
Government size  0.22 Data
Leisure preference  1.5901 Total hours worked = 1/3
R&D productivity & 1 Normalized7
Standing on toes e¤ect  0.5 Benchmark
Substitution parameter  2.2727 Monopolistic markup = 1.1
Standing on shoulders e¤ect  0.9593 Output growth rate = 2%
Size of innovation cluster  0.25 Comin (2004)
Physical capital depreciation rate  0.0318 Capital-output ratio = 2.5
Our parameterization regarding the R&D process basically follows the approach in Jones
and Williams (2000). First, we normalize the R&D productivity & to unity. The value of
the parameter for the standing on toes e¤ect  is somewhat di¢ cult to calibrate because, as
argued by Stokey (1995), the empirical literature does not provide much guidance on such a
parameter. In our analysis, we thus choose an intermediate value  = 0:5 as a benchmark,
but we will allow it to vary over the whole interval from 0 to 0.564.8 The substitution
parameter  is closely related to the markup of the intermediate rms. We set  to be
2.2727 such that, given 1  , the (unconstrained) markup in our economy is 1.1, which lies
7Our results are independent of the value of &.
8If the value of  is over 0.564, the second-order condition of the governments maximization with respect
to K will not be satised.
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within the reasonable range estimated for US industries (e.g., Laitner and Stolyarov, 2004;
Yang, 2018). Next, we use the output growth rate to calibrate the extent of the standing on
shoulders e¤ect . In our model we have:
gY =

1

  

gA + n: (28)
Given that gA = n=(1  ) and that we have already assigned values to 1  , , n and ,
we can then choose  to target the empirical level of the output growth rate in the US, which
is around 2%. This results in  = 0:9593 as our baseline value. Finally, as a benchmark we
choose the size of the innovation cluster  = 0:25 by following Comin (2004). In this case
the markup is not bound by the adoption constraint. If the value of  is large, the markup
will then be constrained and determined by this parameter. In subsection 4.3 we will run  
from 0 to 0.515 as a robustness check.
4.2 The optimal capital tax with transitional dynamics
Under our benchmark parameterization, Figure 1 plots the relationship between the level of
welfare and the rate of capital income tax, which exhibits an inverted-U shaped relationship.
Of particular note, the optimal capital tax is positive, and its value is around 11.9%. The
Chamley-Judd result of zero capital tax does not hold in our R&D-based growth model.
Figure 1: The level of welfare and the rate of capital income tax
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Given that the government is limited to
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capital and labor taxation to nance a x amount of the government expenditure, not taxing
capital income implies that the labor income must be taxed at a higher rate. Although a
zero capital tax e¢ ciently leaves the capital market undistorted, a high labor tax distorts
the labor market severely by decreasing the after-tax wage income and in turn reduces total
labor supply. As a consequence, there is less labor devoted to the production in the R&D
sector, which then results in fewer equilibrium varieties for the nal-good production, and
ultimately depresses the level of consumption and welfare. In short, to achieve the social
optimum, it is necessary to balance both distortions in the capital and labor markets. This
implies that an extreme case of the zero capital tax is often suboptimal.
4.3 Policy implications of R&D externalities
In this subsection, we investigate how the optimal capital tax responds to relevant parame-
ters, in particular those related to the innovation process. More importantly, we shed some
light on the roles of R&D externalities in the design of optimal tax policies. To this end, we
provide a robustness check for whether the positive optimal capital tax still survives under
various scenarios. In what follows, we propose some relevant parameters that need to be
considered by the policy-makers. The results are depicted in Figures 2 to 6. Our robustness
analysis generates several implications.
Figure 2: The optimal capital tax rate and the stepping on toes e¤ect
First, Figures 2 and 3 show that the optimal capital tax rate is increasing in  (the
stepping on toes e¤ect) and  (the standing on shoulders e¤ect). With su¢ ciently small
values of  and , the optimal capital income tax is negative. Notice that a higher  implies
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that the negative duplication externality is small, and a higher  means that the positive
spillover e¤ect of R&D is relatively strong. Both cases imply a similar circumstance in which
the innovation process is more productive, and in which underinvestment in R&D is more
likely. Under such a situation, the welfare cost of depressing innovation by raising the labor
income tax is larger. Therefore, the government is inclined to increase the capital tax while
reducing the labor tax.
Figure 3: The optimal capital tax rate and the standing on shoulders e¤ect
Second, Figure 4 shows that the optimal capital income tax and the substitution para-
meter  exhibit an inverted-U shaped relationship. A lower  is associated with a higher
monopolistic markup , regardless of whether the adoption constraint is binding or not. The
substitution parameter mainly a¤ects the optimal capital tax in three di¤erent ways. First,
when  is large (when  is small), the degree of the intermediate rmsmonopoly power is
strong. To correct this distortion, the government tends to subsidize capital to o¤set the gaps
between price and the marginal cost; see Judd (1997, 2002). Second, when  is large (when
 is small), the private value of inventions increases. As a result, equilibrium R&D increases,
which in turn makes R&D overinvestment more likely. Therefore, the government tends to
raise the tax on labor because R&D uses labor in our model. These two e¤ects indicate that
the optimal capital tax should be decreasing in the markup as in previous studies. Third,
a small  amplies the productivity of varieties in nal-good production and thus amplies
the e¤ect of gA on gY (see, eq. (28)). In this case, the government is inclined to subsidize
labor by taxing capital since the R&D sector uses labor. This last e¤ect indicates that the
optimal capital tax rate is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods (or increasing in the markup). Figure 4 shows that the rst two e¤ects dominate
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when  is small and the third e¤ect dominants when  becomes su¢ ciently large. Thus the
optimal capital tax reverses as  exceeds a threshold value.
Figure 4: The optimal capital tax rate and the substitution parameter
Third, Figure 5 shows that the optimal capital tax increases in response to a rise in
the size of the innovation cluster (creative destruction). To explain the intuition, we rst
distinguish three e¤ects that creative destruction may have on the incentive to engage in
R&D. The rst positive e¤ect comes from the R&D rm being able to earn prots even for
those of its products that do not really increase the variety of intermediate goods (note that
A;t = PA;t(1 +  ) _At   wtLA;t).9 This is referred to as the carrotby Jones and Williams
(2000). The second negative e¤ect arises, as exhibited in eq. (15), from a higher  that
decreases the equilibrium price of the products in the presence of free entry, even though it
increases the products sold by the R&D rm. The third negative e¤ect is associated with
the no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety, which is displayed in eq. (16). Due
to creative destruction, existing goods have a probability of being replaced by new goods,
and this probability increases with the degree of creative destruction. Therefore, creative
destruction increases the expected capital loss in terms of the return on the equity shares,
and in turn reduces the incentive to engage in R&D. Jones and Williams (2000) dub this
e¤ect as the stick. In the model, the rst and second e¤ects approximately o¤set each
other, leaving the stick e¤ect as the main inuence of creative destruction on R&D. As a
result, a higher  discourages R&D, and hence the government should increase the capital
tax and reduce the labor tax in order to boost labor supply and R&D labor.
9The R&D rm can earn prots from its whole products (1 +  ) _A, in which  _A does not contribute to
the increase of varieties.
20
Figure 5: The optimal capital tax rate and creative destruction
Finally, the optimal capital tax is increasing in the government spending ratio  (see
Figure 6). This result is consistent with Aghion et al. (2013) and Lu and Chen (2015).10
When the need for public expenditure is su¢ ciently small, the government can collect labor
tax revenues to nance the government spending and also to subsidize capital. Note that in
this case the monopoly e¤ect dominates the R&D e¤ect so that the optimal capital tax rate
becomes negative. As the size of government expenditure increases, it is not promising to
rely solely on raising the labor tax, because the distortion to the R&D sector would be too
strong. In this case, it becomes optimal to shift some of the tax burden to capital.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined whether the Chamley-Judd result of zero optimal capital
taxation is valid in a non-scale innovation-based growth model. By calibrating our model to
the US economy, we nd that the optimal capital income tax is positive, at a rate of around
11.9 percent. We also vary the magnitudes of R&D externalities to see how the optimal
capital tax responds. A positive optimal capital income tax is valid in most cases.
Some extensions for future research are worth noting. First, since R&D investment usu-
ally has liquidity problems (Lach, 2002), it would be relevant to introduce a credit constraint
10Lu and Chen (2015) show that in an exogenous growth model with a given share of government expen-
diture in output, the optimal capital income tax is positive and increasing with the the share of government
expenditure. The intuition is that capital accumulation reduces the discounted net marginal product of next
periods capital by way of increasing government expenditure. Thus, the government should tax capital to
correct this distortion.
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Figure 6: The optimal capital tax and the government size
on R&D investment into our model. Second, it would be interesting to examine the optimal
capital tax in an endogenous growth model where both innovation and capital accumula-
tion are the driving forces of economic growth (see, e.g., Iwaisako and Futagami, 2013; Chu
et al., 2018). These directions will no doubt generate new insights into the debate on the
Chamley-Judd result.
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Appendix A. Deriving the steady-state growth rate
To solve for the steady-state growth rate of the economy, from eqs. (13) and (14) we have:
_At
At
=
&
1 +  
LA;t
A1 t
: (A1)
where gA;t = _At=At: Let gZ denote gZ;t =
_Z
Z
the growth rate of any generic variable Z, and
drop the time subscript when referring to any variables in the steady state. The steady-state
growth rate of varieties is given by:
gA =
&
1 +  
LA
A1 
: (A2)
Moreover, the R&D labor share is st = LA;t=(Ntlt). In so doing, eq. (A2) can alternatively
be expressed as:
gA =
&
1 +  
(sNl)
A1 
: (A3)
By taking logarithms of eq. (A3) and di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to
time, we have the following steady-state expression:
gA =

1  n: (A4)
Equipped with the symmetric feature x(i) = x, the equilibrium condition for the capital
market K = Av, and the production in the intermediate-good sector x = v, the aggregate
production function can be rewritten as:
Yt = A
1

 
t L

tK
1 
t : (A5)
Taking logarithms of eq. (A5) and di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to time,
we can infer the following result:
gY =
(1

  )
1   gA + n: (A6)
Inserting eq. (A4) into eq. (A6) yields:
gY = n; (A7)
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where   1 + (
1

 )
1 

1  is a composite parameter.
We now turn to solve the steady-state R&D labor share. In the long run, substituting
_At = gAAt and di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to time gives rise to:
_PA=PA = gY   gA (A8)
From eqs. (12), (15), (17), in the steady state we have:
x =
   1


Y
A
(A9)
PA =
s
1  s
(1  )Y=A
(1 +  )gA
(A10)
r =
x
PA
+
_PA
PA
   gA (A11)
Substituting eqs. (A8), (A9), and (A10) into eq. (A11) yields the result:
r =
 1

Y=A
s
1 s
(1 )Y=A
(1+ )gA
+ gY   (1 +  )gA (A12)
Based on eq. (A12), we have the stationary R&D labor share s as follows:
s =
 1


1 (1 +  )gA
r   gY + (1 +  1 1 )(1 +  )gA
(A13)
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Appendix B. Transition dynamics
This appendix solves the dynamic system of the model under tax shifting from labor income
taxes to capital income taxes. The set of equations under the model is expressed by:
1
ct
= qt; (B1)
 = qt(1  L;t)wt(1  lt); (B2)
rt = (1  K)rK;t   ; (B3)
_ct
ct
= rt   n  ; (B4)
wt = (1  ) Yt
LY;t
; (B5)
rK;t = A
1

 1
t L
1 
Y;t x
 1
t ; (B6)
rK;tKt =


Yt; (B7)
x;t =
   1


Yt
At
; (B8)
rtPA;t = x;t + _PA;t    
_At
At
PA;t; (B9)
Gt = Yt; (B10)
Gt = Nt(KrK;tkt + L;twtlt); (B11)
Yt = A
1= 
t L
1 
Y;t K

t ; (B12)
_Kt = Yt   Ct  Gt   Kt; (B13)
_At
At
=
&
1 +  
LA;t
A1 t
; (B14)
PA;t =
st
1  st
(1  )Yt
(1 +  ) _At
; (B15)
Ntlt = LY;t + LA;t: (B16)
The above 16 equations determine 16 unknowns {ct, l t, At, K t, LY;t, x t, rK;t, x;t r t, Gt, L;t,
Y t, q t, LA;t, PA;t, w t}, where qt is the Hamiltonian multiplier, Ct = Ntct, Kt  Ntkt = Atxt,
and st= LA;t=N tlt. Based on Kt = Ntkt = Atxt, and eqs. (B1), (B2), (B5), and (B12), we
can obtain:
 =
1
ct
(1  L;t)(1  ) Yt
LY;t
(1  lt): (B17a)
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From eqs. (B5), (B7), and (B11), we have:
L;t = (1  st)
   

K
1   : (B17b)
Moreover, to solve the balanced growth rate, we dene the following transformed variables:
k^t  Kt
Nt
; c^t  Ct
Nt
; y^t  Yt
Nt
; a^t  At
N
=(1 )
t
; st  LA;t=Ntlt: (B18)
Based on eqs. (B16), (B15), (B17a), and the above denitions, we can obtain:

(1  lt) =
1
c^t
[1  (1  st)
   

K
1   ](1  )a^
1= 
t (k^t)
[1  st)lt] : (B19a)
From eq. (B19a), we can infer the following expression:
lt = lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K); (B19b)
where
@lt
@k^t
=

k^t(
lt
1 lt + )
lt; (B20a)
@lt
@a^t
=
(1=  )
a^t(
lt
1 lt + )
lt; (B20b)
@lt
@c^t
=   lt
c^t(
lt
1 lt + )
; (B20c)
@lt
@st
=
L;t
(1 L;t) + 
(1  st)( lt1 lt + )
lt; (B20d)
@lt
@K
=
(1  st) (1 )
(1  L;t)( lt1 lt + )
lt: (B20e)
Based on (B3), (B4), (B7), (B12), (B18), and Ct = Ntct, we have:
gc^;t  dc^t=dt
c^t
= (1  K)

(a^t)
1= [
(1  st)lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K)
k^t
]1          gY : (B21)
From eqs. (B10), (B12), (B13), and (B18), we can directly infer:
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gk^;t 
dk^t=dt
k^t
= (1  )(a^t)1= [ (1  st)lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K)
k^t
]1    c^t
k^t
     gY : (B22)
According to eqs. (B14) and (B18), we can further obtain:
ga^;t  da^t=dt
a^t
=
&
1 +  
[stlt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K)]

a^1 t
  gA: (B23)
In what follows, to simplify the notation we suppress those arguments of the labor supply
function. From eq. (B18), taking logarithms of eqs. (B19a) and (B12) and di¤erentiating
the resulting equations with respect to time, we have:
gy^;t = (1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t + (1  )( _lt=lt  
_st
1  st ); (B24)
_lt=lt = f(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t   [ + L;t=(1  L;t)]g=[ + lt=(1  lt)]: (B25)
Taking logarithms of eq. (B15) di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to time,
we obtain:
_PA;t
PA;t
= (1=    )ga^;t + gk^;t + (1  + 
st
1  st )
_st
st
+ (1    )
_lt
lt
+ gY   gA: (B26)
Combining eqs. (B9), (B15), (B18), (B21), (B24), (B25), and (B26) together, we obtain:
dst=dt
st
= f   [ (   1)(1 +  )(1  st)
(1  )st    ](gA + ga^;t) + ga^;t + gA   [1 +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt) ]
[(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t]g=f1  + 
st
1  st +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)( +
L;t
1  L;t )
st
1  stg:
(B27)
Note that rt   gY   gc^;t = . As a result, in the steady state we have r   gY = :
Inserting eq. (B18) into eq. (B17b) yields:
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L;t = (1  st)
   

K
1   : (B28)
Based on eqs. (B21), (B22), (B23),(B27), and (B28), the dynamic system can be ex-
pressed as:
dk^t=dt
k^t
= (1  )(a^t)1= [ (1  st)lt
k^t
]1    c^t
k^t
     gY ; (B29a)
da^t=dt
a^t
=
&
1 +  
(stlt)

a^1 t
  gA; (B29b)
dc^t=dt
c^t
= (1  K)

(a^t)
1= [
(1  st)lt
k^t
]1          gY ; (B29c)
dst=dt
st
= f   [ (   1)(1 +  )(1  st)
(1  )st    ](gA + ga^;t) + ga^;t + gA   [1 +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt) ]
[(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t]g=f1  + 
st
1  st +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)( +
L;t
1  L;t )
st
1  stg:
(B29d)
Linearizing eqs. (B29a), (B29b), (B29c), and (B29d) around the steady-state equilibrium
yields: 0BBBB@
dk^t=dt
da^t=dt
dc^t=dt
dst=dt
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
b11 b12 b13 b14
b21 b22 b23 b24
b31 b32 b33 b34
b41 b42 b43 b44
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
k^t   k^
a^t   a^
c^t   c^
st   s
1CCCCA+
0BBBB@
b15
b25
b35
b45
1CCCCA dK , (B30)
where
b11 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@k^t
; b12 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@a^t
; b13 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@c^t
; b14 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@st
; b15 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@K
;
b21 =
@(da^t=dt)
@k^t
; b22 =
@(da^t=dt)
@a^t
; b23 =
@(da^t=dt)
@c^t
; b24 =
@(da^t=dt)
@st
; b25 =
@(da^t=dt)
@K
;
b31 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@k^t
; b32 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@a^t
; b33 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@c^t
; b34 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@st
; b35 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@K
;
b41 =
@(dst=dt)
@k^t
; b42 =
@(dst=dt)
@a^t
; b43 =
@(dst=dt)
@c^t
; b44 =
@(dst=dt)
@st
; b45 =
@(dst=dt)
@K
:
Due to the complicated calculations, we do not list the analytical results for bij; where
i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g:
Let `1, `2, `3, and `4 be the four characteristic roots of the dynamic system. Due to
the complexity involved in calculating the four characteristic roots, we do not try to prove
the saddle-point stability analytically. Instead, via a numerical simulation, we show that
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the dynamic system has two positive and two negative characteristic roots. For expository
convenience, in what follows let `1 and `2 be the negative root, and `3 and `4 be the positive
roots. The general solution is given by:0BBBB@
k^t
a^t
c^t
st
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
k^(K)
a^(K)
c^(K)
s(K)
1CCCCA+
0BBBB@
1 1 1 1
h21 h22 h23 h24
h31 h32 h33 h34
h41 h42 h43 h44
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
D1e
`1t
D2e
`2t
D3e
`3t
D4e
`4t
1CCCCA : (B31a)
where D1; D2, D3, and D4 are undetermined coe¢ cients and
4j =

b12 b13 b14
b22   `j b23 b24
b32 b33   `j b34
 ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; (B31b)
h2j =

`j   b11 b13 b14
 b21 b23 b24
 b31 b33   `j b34
 =4j ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; (B31c)
h3j =

b12  b11 b14
b22   `j  b21 b24
b32  b31 b34
 =4j ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; (B31d)
h4j =

b12 b13 `j   b11
b22   `j b23  b21
b32 b33   `j  b31
 =4j ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g: (B31e)
The government changes the capital tax rate K from K0 to K1 at t=0. Based on eqs.
(B31a)-(B31e), we employ the following equations to describe the dynamic adjustment of k^t,
a^t, c^t and st:
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k^t =
(
k^(K0);
k^(K1) +D1e
`1t +D2e
`2t +D3e
`3t +D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+ (B32a)
a^t =
(
a^(K0);
a^(K1) + h21D1e
`1t + h22D2e
`2t + h23D3e
`3t + h24D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B32b)
c^t =
(
c^(K0);
c^(K1) + h31D1e
`1t + h32D2e
`2t + h33D3e
`3t + h34D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B32c)
st =
(
s(K0);
s(K1) + h41D1e
`1t + h42D2e
`2t + h43D3e
`3t + h44D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B32d)
where 0  and 0+ denote the instant before and instant after the policy implementation,
respectively. The values for D1; D2; D3 and D4 are determined by:
k^0  = k^0+ ; (B33a)
a^0  = a^0+ ; (B33b)
D3 = D4 = 0: (B33c)
Equations (B33a) and (B33b) indicate that both k^t (= KtNt ) and a^t (=
At
N
=(1 )
t
) remain
intact at the instant of policy implementation since Kt, At, and Nt are predetermined vari-
ables. Equation (B33c) is the stability condition which ensures that all k^t, a^t, c^t and st
converge to their new steady-state equilibrium. By using eqs. (B33a) and (B33b), we can
obtain:
D1 =
[k^(K0)  k^(K1)]h22   [a^(K0)  a^(K1)]
h22   h21 ; (B34a)
D2 =
[a^(K0)  a^(K1)]  [k^(K0)  k^(K1)]h21
h22   h21 : (B34b)
Inserting eqs. (B33c), (B34a), and (B34b) into eqs. (B32a)-(B32d) yields:
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k^t =
8>><>>:
k^(K0);
k^(K1) +
[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]
h22 h21 e
`1t
+ [a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21
h22 h21 e
`2t;
t = 0 
t  0+
a^t =
8>><>>:
a^(K0);
a^(K1) +
f[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]gh21e`1t
h22 h21
+ f[a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21gh22e
`2t
h22 h21 ;
t = 0 
t  0+
c^t =
8>><>>:
c^(K0);
c^(K1) +
f[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]gh31e`1t
h22 h21
+ f[a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21gh32e
`2t
h22 h21 ;
t = 0 
t  0+
st =
8>><>>:
s(K0);
s(K1) +
f[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]gh41e`1t
h22 h21
+ f[a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21gh42e
`2t
h22 h21 ;
t = 0 
t  0+
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Appendix C. Proof of comparative statics
From eqs. (B29a)-(B29d), we have:
dk^t=dt
k^t
= (1  )(a^t)1= ( lY;t
k^t
)1    c^t
k^t
     gY ; (C1a)
da^t=dt
a^t
=
&
1 +  
[lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; lY;t; K)  lY;t]
a^1 t
  gA; (C1b)
dc^t=dt
c^t
= (1  K)

(a^t)
1= (
lY;t
k^t
)1          gY ; (C1c)
dst=dt
st
= f   [ (   1)(1 +  )(1  st)
(1  )st    ](gA + ga^;t) + ga^;t + gA   [1 +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt) ]
[(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t]g=f1  + 
st
1  st +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)( +
L;t
1  L;t )
st
1  stg:
(C1d)
In the steady state dk^t=dt
k^t
= da^t=dt
a^t
= dc^t=dt
c^t
= dst=dt
st
= 0; we then have the following steady-
state results:
c^
k^
= (1  )(a^)1= [ (1  s)l
k^
]1       gY ; (C1e)
gA =
&
1 +  
(sl)
a^1 
; (C1f)
 = (1  K)

(a^)1= [
(1  s)l
k^
]1       gY ; (C1g)
0 =    [ (   1)(1 +  )(1  s)
(1  )s    ]gA + gA: (C1h)
Based on eq. (C1h), we have:
s =
 1


1 (1+ )gA
 +

1 +  1


1 

(1+ )gA
: (C2)
From eqs. (B3) and (C1g), we can obtain
r   gY =  > 0: (C3)
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Equation eq. (C1g) can be rearranged as:
y^=k^ = (a^)1= [
(1  s)l
k^
]1  =
( +  + gY )
(1  K) : (C4a)
Substituting eq. (C4a) into eq. (C1e) gives rise to:
c^
y^
= f(1  )( +  + gY )
(1  K)      gY g
k^
y^
= (1  )  ( + gY ) (1  K)
( +  + gY )
: (C5a)
To ensure that the steady-state consumption-output ratio c^=y^ is positive, we impose the
restriction (1  )  ( + gY ) (1 K)(++gY ) > 0 for all values of the time preference rate . As a
consequence, lim!0 c^=y^>0 implies:
(1  )  (1  K)

> 0: (C5b)
From eq (C1f), we can derive:
a^ = [
&
(1 +  )gA
]1=(1 )(sl)=(1 ): (C6)
Based on eq. (B28), we can infer the following expression:
L = (1  s)
   

K
1   ; (C7a)
where
@L
@K
=  (1  s)


1   < 0: (C7b)
Equipped with eqs. (B1), (B2), (B5), and LY = N(1  s)l, we can obtain:
l
1  l =
y^
c^
(1  L)(1  )
(1  s) : (C8)
Inserting eqs. (C5a) and (C7a) into eq. (C8) yields:
l =
8><>:
1  
+ 1
[(1 ) (+gY )
(1 K )
(++gY )
]
(1 L)(1 )
(1 s)
;  > 0
1 ;  = 0
; (C9a)
where
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@l
@K
=
8<:
( 1 s
1  )[1 +  1
(+gY )
+(1+ )gA
](1 l)l
(++gY )(1 L)[1  (+gY ) (1 K )(++gY ) ]
> 0 ;  > 0
0 ;  = 0
: (C9b)
Combining eqs. (C2), (C6), and (C9b) together, we can derive
a^ = [
&
(1 +  )gA
]1=(1 )(sl)=(1 ); (C10a)
where
@a^
@K
=

(1  ) a^
@l
l@K
> 0: (C10b)
Based on eqs. (C4a), (C9b), (B12), and (B18), we have:
y^ = a^
1= 
1  [
(1  K)
( +  + gY )
]

1  (1  s)l; (C11a)
where
@y^
@K
= [
@l
l@K
  
(1  )(1  K) ]y^
>
<
0;   1 + 1=  
1  

1  : (C11b)
According to eqs. (C4a), (C5a), and (C11b), we obtain:
k^ =
(1  K)
( +  + gY )
y^; (C12a)
c^ = [(1  )  ( + gY ) (1  K)
( +  + gY )
]y^; (C12b)
Inserting eq. (C11a) into (C12a) and (C12b), we can derive the following comparative statics:
@k^
@K
=
(1  K)y^
( +  + gY )
f @l
l@K
  1
(1  )(1  K)g
>
<
0; (C12c)
@c^
@K
= f ( + gY )
( +  + gY )
+ [(1  )
  (1  K)( + gY )
( +  + gY )
][
@l
l@K
  
(1  )(1  K) ]gy^
>
<
0:
(C12d)
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